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ABSTRACT
This research attempts to explain the large differences in the early diffusion of
the mafia across different areas of Sicily. We advance the hypothesis that, after
the demise of Sicilian feudalism, the lack of publicly provided property-right
protection from widespread banditry favored the development of a florid mar-
ket for private protection and the emergence of a cartel of protection providers:
the mafia. This would especially be the case in those areas (prevalently concen-
trated in the Western part of the island) characterized by the production and com-
mercialization of sulphur and citrus fruits, Sicily’s most valuable export goods
whose international demand was soaring at the time. We test this hypothesis
combining data on the early incidence of mafia across Sicilian municipalities
and on the distribution of sulphur reserves, land suitability for the cultivation
of citrus fruits, distance from the main commercial ports, and a variety of other
geographical controls. Our empirical findings provide support for the proposed
hypothesis documenting, in particular, a significant impact of sulphur extraction,
terrain ruggedness, and distance from Palermo’s port on mafia’s early diffusion.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
There is growing interest among social scientists in understanding the workings of organized
crime and its profound socio-economic consequences (Jennings, 1984; Fiorentini and Peltz-
man, 1997; Skaperdas, 2001). Much of this research has focused on the study of mafia-type
criminal organizations in various parts of the world including southern Italy, Russia, USA
and Japan (Gambetta, 1996, 2009; Varese, 2005, 2011; Mastrobuoni and Patacchini, 2011;
Pinotti, 2011). Despite the increasing number of theoretical and empirical contributions on
the nature and structure of these organizations (Gambetta, 1996; Skaperdas, 2001), the eco-
nomic origins of the mafia(s) remain relatively unexplored, limiting our understanding of the
phenomenon and of the large differences in the presence of the mafia(s) across and within
countries.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by empirically investigating the determinants of
the emergence of the Sicilian mafia, the oldest and most notorious example of this sort of
organizations, which dates back to the nineteenth century and which has had a considerable
and long-lasting effect on the socio-economic development of Sicily1. In particular, this
research aims at shedding light on one of the most puzzling questions about the history of
the Sicilian mafia: why did the mafia emerge in the western part of Sicily but not in the
eastern part of the island, where, in fact, it remained virtually absent until the second part of
the twentieth century2.
The hypothesis advanced and tested in this paper is that the mafia - which following
Gambetta (1996) we intend as an industry of private protection - emerged after the demise
of Sicilian feudalism, in a context characterized by a severe lack of state property-right en-
forcement and low interpersonal trust, in response to the rising demand for the protection of
goods and economic transactions. In particular, the mafia would thrive in areas prone to the
production and commercialization of sulphur and citrus fruits, Sicily’s most valuable export
commodities which, both in the production and transportation stages, were especially vul-
nerable to predatory attacks. In fact, the steady rise in the demand for these goods on the in-
ternational markets over the course of the nineteenth century, determined a large and durable
positive shock to the value of protection in these areas. In sum, we argue, the geographic
fitness for sulphur extraction and citrus fruits cultivation, combined with the exogenous rise
in the value of these commodities, favored the development in certain areas (prevalently con-
1 Lupo (1993)and Dickie (2005) provide an excellent account of the history of the Sicilian mafia and of its
expansion to other regions of Italy and to the United States.With regard to the economic and non-economic
costs of the mafia, Pinotti (2011) examines the case of the diffusion of the mafia in the southern Italian
regions of Apulia and Basilicata over the last thirty years; he estimates that, over this period, the presence
of the mafia determined a 16% decrease in GDP per capita and a parallel sharp increase in murder rates.
2 This aspect has been discussed by historians, sociologists and economists alike. Some examples include
Lupo (1993); Gambetta (1996) and Sylos Labini (2003).
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centrated in the Western part of the island) of a florid market for private protection and the
emergence of the mafia, a cartel of providers who took control of that market.
Based on this argument one would expect higher incidence of mafia activities in : i)
areas characterized by greater sulphur reserves; ii) in areas with more suitable agro-climatic
conditions for the cultivation citrus fruits (or similarly valuable crops such as olive). Fur-
thermore, the presence of the mafia would be more marked in: iii) communities situated in
strategic locations on the routes connecting production sites to commercial ports (as pro-
tection intervened in the transportation stage as well); and in iv) communities located in
more remote and mountainous locations where the presence of state police forces, and the
protection offered by them, was more limited.
To empirically test these predictions we combine historical data on the presence of the
mafia over the second half of the nineteenth century in Sicilian municipalities with high-
resolution data on geomorphological and climatic conditions, crop-specific soil suitability,
presence of sulphur reserves, proximity to the main roads, distance from the main commer-
cial ports, and a variety of other geographical and demographic controls including terrain
ruggedness, proximity to rivers and other waterways, population density, etc.. The use of
such a unique dataset at the municipality level is especially useful to to investigate within-
region variation in the diffusion of the mafia.
Our empirical findings provide support for our main hypothesis: exogenous variations
in the demand for protection - as predicted by the geographical fitness for high-value mining
and agricultural productions - contribute to explain geographical differences in the early
incidence of the mafia, especially between east and west of Sicily. In particular, the existence
of sulphur reserves, terrain ruggedness, and proximity to Palermo (by far the most important
Sicilian commercial port at the time) are good predictors of the intensity in mafia’s activity
in the period under consideration.
This research relates, in primis, to the relatively small but growing body of literature
on the socio-economic foundations of organized crime and mafia-type organizations. In
particular, it integrates the only two empirical studies that have looked at the historical emer-
gence of the Sicilian mafia. The first one is by Bandiera (2003) whom, like us, subscribe
to Gambetta’s original view of the mafia as an industry for private protection. Within this
framework, Bandiera uses a common agency model to formalize the idea that the mafia’s
should have been historically more active in towns were land was more fragmented3, and
finds support for this hypothesis using qualitative data from a 1881 parliamentary survey on
3 The argument is based on the idea that the purchase of protection from a single landowner imposes a
negative externality on the other ones (since it deflects thieves on their properties), and that, hence, landlords
will be competing with each other to acquire protection and to exclude others from it. By increasing the
number of competing landlords, land fragmentation should increase mafia’s potential profits.
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77 municipalities in western Sicily. The second contribution is by Pazzona (2010), who, in
line with the view of historians such as Lupo (1993) and Pezzino (1995), examines the role
of the mafia in the socio-economic struggles between emerging classes which followed the
demise of Sicilian feudalism. His empirical analysis, performed on a somewhat larger sam-
ple than that used by Bandiera, documents that the mafia was more likely to emerge where
the competition by new social actors was harsher, particularly in areas where land value
was higher, land holdings larger, population smaller, and fewer peasants owned the land.
Although these studies certainly contribute to a better understanding of the various factors
involved in the emergence of the mafia, the data and the scope of the empirical analysis are,
in both cases, limited to the West of Sicily, and hence less than ideal for the study of differ-
ence in the incidence of the mafia between eastern and western part of the island, which our
analysis focuses on.
More in general, the results of this research complements the literature on the emer-
gence of persistent social institutions as the consequence of some kind of “historical acci-
dent” (Acemoglu et al., 2001), which in this case, we argue, would be represented by the
sudden rise in the trade of Sicilian commodities whose impact on the emergence of the mafia
would play through the interaction with the island’s natural endowements.
Finally, although geographical characteristics per se are not the focus of our study, the
findings we present can also be interpreted in the context of the debate on the long-term im-
pact of geography on socio-economic development. Previous research has documented that
the environment can influence economic performance directly, through its effect on health
and agricultural productivity (Landes, 1998; Sachs and Malaney, 2002), and indirectly, by
setting the conditions in which social norms and political institutions have formed (Sokoloff
and Engerman, 2000; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Durante, 2009; Nunn and Puga, 2009;
Michalopoulos et al., 2010) or by defining environmental constraints to population growth
(Galor and Weil, 2000). The evidence presented here suggests that, under given economic
circumstances, geographic characteristics may have contributed to the emergence of partic-
ular forms of social organizations (criminal ones in this case) which have persisted overtime
and continue to have non-neglibile socio-economic effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide some
historical background on nineteenth century Sicily and discuss the issue of protection in that
context. In section 3 we describe the data and discuss our emprical strategy. In section 4 we
present our empirical findings before concluding in Section 5.
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II. PROTECTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In his seminal contribution, Gambetta (1996) conceptualizes the Sicilian mafia as an industry
of private protection, and argues that its emergence was associated with an increase in the
demand for protection over the period comprised between the demise of feudalism (1812)
and Italy’s unification (1861).4 In particular, the rising demand for protection was centered
around the production and commercialization of three main categories of commoddities:
cattle, valuable crops, and sulphur.
I. PROTECTION OF CATTLE AND RICH CULTIVATIONS
Over the period under examination, the large majority of Sicilian former feudal lords lived
in the capital city, Palermo, hence at a distance from their properties. These were gen-
erally rented out to local administrators (gabelloti) who were in charge of managing the
landholding’s productive activities and who invested their own capital in it. Given the rel-
atively short duration of their contracts, the gabelloti had little incentive to make long term
investments to improve land productivity; rather they invested in livestock, particularly cat-
tle, which, however, had to be protected from local bandits (briganti).5 The demand for
protection against cattle-stealing was particularly high in areas characterized by important
differences in altitude, and hence prone to transhumance.6The most profitable agricultural
land was that suitable for the cultivation of citrus fruits, mostly concentrated in the north-
ern and western coastal areas. Over the course of the nineteenth century, a sharp increase
in international demand for citrus fruits determined an impressive increase in the produc-
tion and commercialization of these products, which were generally shipped from Palermo’s
port - Sicily most important one - to both European and non-European markets.7 As a con-
sequence, investments in the cultivation of citrus fruits were extremely profitable but also
rather risky. In fact, if on the one hand large initial investments were required for purpose of
land preparation and the installation of adequate irrigation infrastructure, on the other hand
4 Both Gambetta (1996) and Lupo (1993) strongly oppose the view that the mafia would be related to some
distinctive traits of Sicilian “culture” (see Cutrera (1900) for an early account of some of these rather
peculiar theories).
5 Briganti had been present in southern Italy since the XVI-XVII century and had often been used by feudal
landlords to protect their holdings (see Candeloro, 1956).
6 Lupo (2004) emphasizes the importance of the availability of pastures at different altitudes for non stabling
cattle-breeding.
7 As Dickie (2004) points out: “Sicilian oranges and lemons were shipped to New York and London when
they were still virtually unknown in the mountains of the Sicilian interior. In 1834, over 400,000 cases of
lemons were exported. By 1850, it was 750,000. In the mid-1880s an astonishing 2.5 million cases of Italian
citrus fruit arrived in New York every year, most of them from Palermo. In 1860, the year of Garibaldi’s
expedition, it was calculated that Sicily’s lemon groves were the most profitable agricultural land in Europe,
out-earning even the fruit orchards around Paris. In 1876, citrus cultivation yielded more than sixty times
the average profit per hectare for the rest of the island.” (p. 39).
5
a long time would pass between the trees’ initial plantation and the commercialization of the
first harvest. Furthermore, due to their high commercial value, citrus fruits were particularly
exposed to attacks from briganti both at the production and the commercialization stage.
The combination of potentially high and vulnerable yields in those areas were citruis fruits
could be successfully grown resulted in high demand for protection of these commodities
and, consequently, in high potential profits for those who could offer it.
II. PROTECTION OF SULPHUR
The demand for private protection also arised from the need to protect monopoly power,
enforce cartels and restrict competition. This was especially the case for the sulfur industry.
In fact, sulfur mine galleries were rented out and, not unusually, the right to exploit them had
to be defended from violent attacks. Furthermore, once extracted, sulfur minerals - largely
produce for export purposes - had to be transported to Palermo’s port, so cargoes safety along
the way had to be ensured as well. Starting in the first decades of the nineteenth century,
international demand for sulphur soared as this represented an important intermediary input
for the industrial and chemical productions which were quickly expanding both in Britain and
France.8 For all of the nineteenth century and until the beginning of the twenthieth, Sicily
represented the largest producer of sulfur in the world with ever increasing export levels9:
in volume, Sicilian sulfur exports grew at a yearly average rate of 8.8%, from 25,000 tons
in 1832 to 180,000 in 1859 (Gatto, 1925).10The high commercial value of sulfur did not
translate into higher wages or better living conditions for miners, who had to compete with
low-wage agrictultural workers.11 Each miner had to protect his earnings from other miners,
as raw material extracted by miners was usually paid only once a week and no public law
8 In 1855 over 70% of Sicilian sulphur was exported to France and Great Britain (Squarzina, 1963). Sulphur
is the base of oil of vitriol, and of almost all the acids and alkalis which are extensively used in various
manufacturing processes. It is also required for the manufacture of gunpowder as well as for the production
of various medicines(Rawson, 1840). Even if industrial substitutes for sulfur have been discovered and
developed since the late ’40s, the use of sulfur gained again momentum because of its use in the grape
cultivation as a fungicide. Sulphur accounted for 20% of total export value in 1940(Pescosolido, 2010).
9 Figures for 1893 reveals that Sicily supplied the 83% of sulphur used worldwide; an additional 10% was
produced in other regions of Italy and the remaining 7% was produced in the rest of the world, particularly
in Japan (source: French Ministery of Public Works).
10 We estimate that sulphur production represented about 2.5% of Sicilian GDP in 1861. To compute this
estimate we refer to data available from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) according to
which Italian GDP in 1861 could be estimated to about 7,774 million liras, and the Sicilian population
represented about 10% of the total national population. From this information, since Sicilian per-capita
GDP was at the time very similar to the Italian one (Daniele and Malanima, 2007) we derive an estimate of
Sicily’s aggregate GDP. Finally we compute the total GDP attributable to sulphur production as the product
of the total quantity sold in 1861 (160,000 tons) and its average price over that year (120 liras/ton; source:
Squarzina, 1963).
11 In 1860, the average daily wage was around 2 liras, while the value of the sulphus extracted by a miner in
one day was between two and three times higher.
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enforcement was provided in the mines. Labor costs and transportation costs accounted for
around 56% and 27% of total costs respectively.12 Transportation costs were extremely high
in this environment: mules caravanes - the most common way of transporting sulphur to
destination - were extremely slow and costly and the routes generally very insecure due to
risk of predation on the part of bandits. All these factors contributed to increase sulphur
producers’ demand for protection both around the mines and along the routes connecting
these to the main ports.
III. SUPPLY OF PROTECTION
In Gambetta’s view, in the absence of publicly provided property-right protection, the busi-
ness of private protection prospered in the interior of the island, in localities contiguous to
the most prosperous areas: those surrounding Palermo as well as those where citrus culti-
vation and sulphur extraction were more widepread. In these areas protection services were
greatly demanded, the supply of individuals specialized in the use of violence was abundant,
and information about potential customers as well as suppliers’ reputation flew quickly.13 As
the violent threats used to protect thir “clients” could also be used to intimidate them as well
, early mafiosi were in a position to create their own demand; hence the distinction between
offered protection and threatened extortion was genereally unclear. Indeed, various forms of
agreements linked briganti and mafiosi, as the latter used the threat of the former to justify
the services they offered.
On a related note, Lupo (1993) emphasizes the relevance of riots and insurrections for
the supply of potential mafiosi’s skills and organization. Indeed, mafiosi played an active
role in the various insurrections that took place in Sicily, and especially in Palermo, over
12 The data are available from the Italian Ministery of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (1894) and refer
to the year 1893. Nevertheles, as reported by several scholars, sulfur production technology did not change
much over the course of the nineteenth century and, most likely, factors’ shares remained relatively stable as
well. Physical capital and energy consumption accounted altogheter for less than 7% of total cost, consistent
with the extremely low technology intensity of the sulfur production process (even in the late part of the
century).
13 In the countryside, gabelloti were surrounded by a number of guards, former soldiers and former convicts,
all trained in the use of violence whom, formerly employed by feudal lords, were now looking for new
job opportunities. Local networks of such individuals quickly emerged: extremely well informed about
the local context, of both potential victims of violent predation and potential perpetrators, they were in the
position to establish a credible reputation as effective protectors. This process led, following Franchetti’s
expression, to the “democratization of violence”.
7
the course of the nineteenth century.14 Secret societies, such as the Freemasonry, provided
mafiosi with some of their rituals and organizational style.15 Nevertheless, the mafiosi fa-
vored whoever could best grant the continuation and expansion of their business - be it the
rioters or the State - and in several instancs the new Italian State used their local power to
police and control the territory.
As to why the mafia emerged in western but not in eastern Sicily, Gambetta (1996)
argues that in the east former feudal landlords were more present on their lands and less
divided than in the west and, as consequence, were better equipped to maintain a monop-
sonistic control of violence and enforcement. However, Gambetta does not develop this
argument further and does not spell out the historical determinants of this difference. Lupo
(1993) suggests that in the areas around Agrigento and Caltanissetta the emergence of the
mafia was more related to the sulfur industry (sulfur mines were concentrated in the western
and central parts of Sicily), with a lower social class characterization of the mafiosi, whereas
around Palermo, where landlords and merchants concentrated, the connection between aris-
tocrats and the protagonists of insurrections played a major role.16
III. DATA
I. MAFIA MEASURES
Mafia data come from several historical sources and allow us to provide a very detailed
picture on the presence of mafia activity in the second half of the 19th century, when most
of historians trace back the birth of the Sicilian mafia. Our data are based on the historical
and sociological research conducted by Cutrera (1900) on the Sicilian mafia. In his book he
draws a map with the intensity of mafia activity (on a four level scale) in 253 municipalities,
according to his own judgement, which followed from his previous direct experience as an
officer of public security and from his detailed study of the mafia phenomenon. We call this
variable mafia_c. This qualitative measure assume values equal to 0, 1, 2 or 3 if mafia is not
14 The demise of feudalism in 1812 already reflected a great tension between barons and the Bourbons (al-
though barons lost their feudal rights, they maintained their properties and gained, at least for a few years,
legislative power and control over the king through the Parliament). Until 1860, there was a constant
alternation of periods of order, insurrections (such as those of 1821 and 1848) and restorations, until the in-
surrection triggered by Garibaldi led to the end of the Bourbons’ domination. This situation did not change
after Italy’s reunification, with another insurrection in 1866 and with several intents by the new State to
impose order through repression.
15 Together with its popular variant, the ‘Carboneria’, the Masonry played a relevant role in the various revolts
and fights for local power.
16 “Da Palermo l’aristocrazia ottocentesca più o meno nuova domina la proprietà fondiaria della Sicilia occi-
dentale e controlla il mercato degli affitti, però nei paesi e nei dintorni della stessa capitale essa deve venire
a confronto con il vasto mondo dei facinorosi. [...] Il rapposto tra facinorosi e grande possidenza palermi-
tana è l’elemento decisivo nel caratterizzare storicamente l’origine della mafia, nel localizzare quest’ultima
nella sezione occidentale dell’isola.” (Lupo, 1996, p. 63)
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present, if mafia presence is very limited, if there is some mafia activity or if mafia presence
is very high. Map presented in figure 1 shows in greater detail the geographical distribution
of our measure of mafia activity at the municipality level.
Cutrera (1900) is a well established source in the criminological and sociological lit-
erature. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been exploited in any previous
economic study. The only two empirical studies that have looked at the historical emergence
of the Sicilian mafia (Bandiera, 2003; Pazzona, 2010) exploit two different datasets that with
respect to Cutrera (1900) have several drawbacks and limitations. The first is the parlia-
mentary enquiry on the conditions of the agricultural class, which took place between 1881
and 1885 and which was directed by Damiani for Sicily (by Jacini at the national level).
This source contains qualitative information for 149 towns, obtained from chief prosecutors,
who were asked to report whether mafia was active in their town and to what extent. The
second source is the parliamentary enquiry on the conditions of Sicily, which took place
between 1874 and 1876, directed by Borsani and with Bonfadini as speaker. Its qualitative
information on mafia activity for 160 towns, obtained from interrogations to several local
authorities, was combined by Pazzona (2010) with that from the previous source to obtain a
more accurate picture of mafia intensity. These two measures present three main problems.
First, they cover less that 45% of Sicilian municipalities (357 at the time). Second, they are
likely to underestimate the intensity of mafia activity. This is especially true for Damiani
inquiry, as extensively discussed by Pazzona (2010). The reason is that a combination of
omertà, real unawareness, fear of retaliation and contiguity with the mafia would all bias
the interviewed local authorities towards understatement. If such factors are not simply ran-
domly distributed across municipalities, but are correlated to the intensity of mafia activity
or to its determinants, this can be a serious problem for empirical analysis. Third, since these
variables code qualitative information reported by different individuals, there is no guarantee
that the interviewd authorities adopted the same scale in their answers.
Cutrera (1900), obviously differs from the previous ones in that it is drawn at a later
point in time, but it presents important advantages. First, it substantially improves the cover-
age to more than 70% of all municipalities. Second, it solves the problem of heterogeneous
evaluation scales. Third, it reduces the risk that measurement errors are correlated to actual
mafia activity (or to its determinants). This is because, unlike local authorities, Cutrera was
not responsive to different local incentives to understate the presence of mafia activity. No-
tice that we do not claim that the risk that measurement errors are correlated with the true
values of mafia intensity (or to its determinants) disappears, since it is still possible that in-
formation available to Cutrera was influenced itself by local conditions and in particular by
mafia presence, but we do claim that relying on a scholar’s evaluation rather than on reports
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from local authorities reduces such risk. For all these reasons we will rely only on Cutrera’s
data for our analysis.
II. GEOMORPHOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL VARIABLES
As widely discussed in the previous section, the demand for protection was particularly high
in areas characterized by cattle breeding and by the production and commercialization of sul-
fur and citrus fruits. We thus construct and use a variety of geomorphological variables and
land quality indicators at municipalities level. Geomorphological variables include different
measure of ruggedness and difference in municipalities elevation. Ruggedness, as proposed
by Nunn and Puga (2009), reflects the possibility for people to hide, something that was very
useful for out-of-law people involved in criminal activity, as Lupo (2004) stresses in describ-
ing Gangi, a small town where mafia was very active because of its position difficult to reach
and control by police forces. Differences in altitude are known to impose limits on the extent
of agriculture, on cattle-breeding (Lupo, 1993) and on the choice of cultivated crops Grigg
(1995). In particular, the difference in altitude should be a good proxy for the existence
of transhumance (i.e. the seasonal move of cattle between pastures at different altitudes),
and during moves the cattle were more vulnerable. This vulnerability should be associated
with the need for protection and therefore to mafia presence. Thus, we use both the max-
imum ruggedness (rugged) (calculated over observations available on a grid of 30 by 30
seconds, from RIX Ruggedness Index) and the difference between maximum and minimum
altitude in the municipal area (diff. altitude) in kilometers, from ISTAT. With regard to land
suitability, high-resolution data on soil suitability for specific crops are available from the
Food and Agriculture Organization Global Agro-Ecological Zones project (FAO-GAEZ)17
The FAO-GAEZ database include a variety of measures of soil suitability constructed under
different assumptions regarding possible irrigation conditions (rain-fed, irrigation, gravity
irrigation, etc.). The FAO measures take into account the impact of both soil composition18
and climatic varables. The data are in grid format, have very high resolution (1’), and as-
sign to each grid cell a score from 0 (totally unsuitable), to 7 (very suitable). As municipal
measures of soil suitability for citrus fruits we use the mean of the suitability index over all
cells comprised in the territory of a given municipality. As an alternative for land suitability,
we construct a dummy equal to one for those municipalities that are characterized by lau-
17 More information on the FAO-GAEZ project can be found at
http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at/w/ctrl?_flow=Vwr&_view=Welcome&idAS=0&idFS=0&fieldmain=main_&idPS=0.
Data from FAO-GAEZ have been used extensively by economists in recent years to investigate a variety of
topics. Examples include Michalopoulos (2011), Nunn and Qian (2008) and Durante (2009).
18 The following factors are considered: slope constraints, terrain fertility constraints, drainage constraints,
texture constraints, and chemical constraints.
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retum phyto-climatic zone (lauretum), the one that better accommodates citrus cultivation.
Alternatively, we also use a dummy for predominance of intensive cultivations (intensive)
(citrus and olives, in particular) over extensive cultivations (wheat, faves, etc.) in 1930, ac-
cording to Basile (1941). Cutrera (1900), based on the Damiani enquiry, defines areas with
different level of land productivity (low, medium or high) that we use as a further alternative
measure for productivity (product). We take into account the availability of water in large
supply (water), since water is a necessary and crucial input for agriculture and in particu-
lar for citrus cultivation. As presented above the 19th century, especially the first half, was
characterized by a dramatic increase in the international demand of both sulfur and citrus
fruits. The former represented a key component in the manufacturing, medical and agron-
omy industry. In this international context, the existence of a large commercial port located
in Palermo had represented an advantage for that area. We obtained from Squarzina (1963)
the number of sulfur mines operating in 1886. Unfortunately we do not know the production
of each of these mines, so we construct a dummy for the presences of at least a mine (sulfur).
From the map by Cary (1799) we construct a dummy variable indicating whether a postal
road passed through the municipality (roads). Having roads from 18th Century allows to
have their exogenous distribution with respect to the discovery of sulfur, since its intensive
excavation and trade only began at the beginning of 19th Century, according to Squarzina
(1963). Since Palermo was already the main port of Sicily during the first half of 19th cen-
tury, we include among the controls the great-circle distance from Palermo (distance), in
kilometers.19 Finally, we collect population data (pop) from the 1853 census by Marzolla
(1856) for 323 municipalities. We calculate population density (density) by using today’s
municipalities’ extension in squared kilometers. At that time total Sicilian population was
2.1 million, more than one tenth of Italian population at that time, and population density
was more than 81 inhabitants per square kilometer, similar to today’s Spain. The historical
demographic pattern is quite homogeneous across municipalities, resulting in a correlation
between population in 2001 and in 1853 above 0.95. Palermo was the largest and denser city
at that time with a population of 185,000 inhabitants and more than one thousand inhabi-
tants per square kilometer, comparable with today’s medium-sized Italian cities. The usual
expected effect of population density is a positive one on economic activity, as urban and
agglomeration economics suggests, however we are mainly interested in the positive effect
of density on criminal activity, as many authors point out (Glaeser et al., 1996; Glaeser and
Sacerdote, 1999; Buonanno et al., 2012). The 1853 census allows us to define two different
19 In 1838, 240 out of 450 merchant vessels left Palermo for foreign ports, while only 65 left Messina, the
second in order of importance (Petino, 1958).
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layers of regional fixed effects: 7 provinces and 24 districts.20 The geographical distribution
of some of the control variables are available in the Appendix.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our basic empirical model is one in which the dependent variable is one of the measures of
mafia activity described above and historico-geographic determinants as regressors. Before
moving to the multivariate analysis, it is worth looking at some simple but interesting pair-
wise correlations, to have a grasp of the underlying mechanisms at play. We start by looking
at the variable built from Cutrera (1900), mafia_c, and then we highlight the similarities that
arise once we use other variables as proxies for mafia activity. First, as well established in
the literature, mafia activity tents to be higher in Western areas of Sicily, the correlation be-
tween mafia_c and longitude being -0.60. The same large and negative correlation (-0.61)
exists between mafia_c and distance from Palermo, since historically the origin of mafia
activity can be found, according to Cutrera (1900) and Lupo (2004), among others, in the
"Conca D’Oro", the area surrounding the city of Palermo. Correlation between mafia_c and
the dummy indicating the presence of a river turns out to be positive (0.34), contrary to what
Sylos Labini (2003) claims. In this respect, it is fair to note that Sylos Labini describes
a Western Sicily with scarce water, while we find a larger concentration of municipalities
through which a river passes precisely in the Western part.21 We do not find important corre-
lations (all below 0.05 in absolute terms) between mafia_c and density in 1853, the presence
of roads in 1799 and the presence of lauretum phyto-climatic zone. There is a positive corre-
lation of mafia_c with the presence of sulfur mines in 1886, around 0.19. As expected from
considerations above, the correlation between the presence of roads in 1799 and the presence
of sulfur mines in 1886 is negligible (below 0.03 in absolute value).
In the first set of OLS regressions, collected in Table 2, we use mafia_c as dependent
variable and regress it against some variables that will not change across specifications plus
some variables that proxy for the difference in elevation and land suitability for agriculture
that will be varied across specifications.22 We run different specifications using different
proxies for the same variables (two variables for ruggedness, rugged and diff.altitude, and
three for land productivity, intensive, lauretum and product) because we want to assess the
robustness of these different measures. The set of variables always in the regressions of Ta-
ble 2 are the presence of sulfur mines (sulfur) and rivers (water), roads (in 1799, roads), a
dummy for coastal municipalities (coast) and population density (in 1853, density). sulfur
20 The provinces at that time were Girgenti (today’s Agrigento) with 40 municipalities, Caltanissetta with 29,
Catania with 55, Messina with 82, Noto with 30, Palermo with 69 and Trapani with 18.
21 This can be due to our definition of rivers, or to the focus of Sylos Labini on the inner parts of Sicily.
22 In all specifications, standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
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is always positive and significant, in most cases at 1% level, confirming our hypothesis of a
positive association between presence of sulfur and mafia activity. river is always positive
and significant at 1% level in all specifications, included (7) and (8) that allows for province
fixed effects. Depending on the specification, rugged and diff.altitude, together with popula-
tion density are positively associated with the intensity of mafia activity. Note that, according
to Bentley (1987), both population density and ruggedness are predictors of land fragmenta-
tion, so that the findings in Bandiera (2003) indicating land fragmentation as determinant of
mafia activity could simply reflect the omission of these variables. The coastal dummy has a
negative coefficient as expected (Cutrera, 1900) claims that among workers in the sailing ac-
tivity mafia was absent), significant in some of the specifications. It turns out that among the
variables measuring land productivity the one always significant and with more explanatory
power is product. Our preferred specification is the one in column (8), one with product and
diff.altitude among the regressors, together with province-level dummies.23 The adjusted
R2 is larger than 0.48 and the coefficints of all the relevant explanatory variables have the
expected sign and are strongly significant.
After having defined our baseline specification, we address its robusness to further
modifications and to the use of different variables measuring mafia activity, with results be-
ing reported in Table 3. In column 1 we add (to specification 8 of Table 2) distance from
Palermo as another explanatory variable: as expected, it is negative and significant. Specifi-
cation 2 uses 24 district dummies instead of the 7 province dummies: some of the explana-
tory variables are less precisely estimated but significance remains, while only distance and
product are no more significant. Specification 3 replicate specification 6 of Table 2 using
different LHS variables. In column 3 the dependent variable used is mafia_cdb, the max-
imum of our original mafia variable and information coming from Damiani and Bonfadini
inquiries. Results are similar to those obtained using mafia_c.
In the following, we split the sample according to different dimensions, so to explore
whether different forces are at play across heterogeneous groups of municipalities. The first
split we perform is the East vs West one: historically, as already debated, mafia were more
active in the Western part of Sicily, but still some mafia activity was in place in the Eastern
part. We arbitrarily split the sample at 14.2E longitude in order to have a balance in the
number of observations, the average mafia_c being 0.9 in the East and 2.1 in the West, and
we run the same regression as in specification 8 of Table 2. Results are reported in columns
1 and 2 of Table 4. In the West the main drivers seem to be sulfur and density, nicely
picking the drivers specific to the mining and urban environment, respectively. In the East
23 Given the discrete nature of mafia_c we performed also ordered probit estimations, whose results are in line
with those obtained here.
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river and product are the variables more related to mafia activity, suggesting a prominent
role for rich cultivations in the mafia business. The larger presence of mafia in the West
is captured by the large, and precisely estimated, constant term. Next, we split the sample
according to population in 1853 (pop), the threshold being 5000. The difference in average
mafia_c between small and large municipalities is not very large (1.2 and 1.7, respectively)
and results indicate a role for sulfur and product in small municipalities, while the variance
in large municipality is mostly captured by provincial fixed effects: among the explanatory
variables, only river is weakly significant. A better way of splitting the sample could be
based not on dimension, but rather on geographical proximity to large cities versus rural
areas, since the literature proposes different drivers for the existence of mafia, as stressed
in the previous sections. We discriminate between municipalities within a distance of 40
kilometers from Palermo, Catania, Messina, Trapani or Girgenti (the "Urban" sample, in
column 5) against the other municipalities, those far away from large cities (the "Rural"
sample, in column 6). The first group of municipalities includes, for example, Palermo and
all the Conca D’Oro region, while the latter includes those municipalities characterized by
large estates with absent owners, most of sulfur mines and harsher lands. As for the case
of population, the difference in average mafia_c between the two groups of municipalities
is not very large: 1.2 in Rural regions and 1.7 in Urban regions. As expected, sulfur turns
out to be positive and significant only in Rural regions, together with product. river and
diff.altitude are weakly significant while interestingly roads is positive and significant in the
Urban sample: this backs the hypothesis that the transit of valuable goods (such as sulfur and
citrus) toward the ports should attract the attention of mafia, on the side of both extortion and
protection.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We presented an empirical analysis of the historical origin of the Sicilian mafia and of its
economic determinants. The mafia spread in western Sicily in the second half of the 19th
century, with a much slower penetration in the eastern part of the island. We collected a new
dataset with detailed information at the municipality level and used it to test the perspective
that an initial shock to the demand for protection, in a context characterized by poor enforce-
ment of law by the state, led to the emergence of mafia as a supplier of private protection.
Once the mafia emerges, its monopoly of violence allows it to further increase the demand
for its services through extortion. We identify the major changes in the demand for protec-
tion, and therefore in the potential profitability of mafia activity, in the impressive increase
in the price of the most important Sicilian exported commodities at the time, namely sulphur
and citric fruits. By using data on land suitability for the extraction of sulphur and the culti-
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vation of citrus, we establish their significant impact on the early diffusion of mafia activity.
We also assess that the early presence of the mafia is positively and significantly correlated
to population density, since this naturally leads to higher demand, and to terrain ruggedness,
which makes state enforcement more difficult, offers hiding possibilities to mafiosi and is
also related to the demand for protection of cattle during the transhumance. Our results may
be interesting from different points of view: historically, they shed light on the origins of
an important and persistence criminal organization; more broadly, they illustrate how the
blessing of an increase in demand may turn, when state enforcement is weak, in the curse
of private protection offered by a criminal organization; finally, they show how geographical
and historical contingencies may lead to the emergence of particular human institutions (in
this case the mafia), which then become self-sustaining and thus persist over time.
15
Figure 1: Mafia density according to Cutrera
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
mafia_c 253 1.45 1.14 0 3
mafia_d 145 0.65 1.02 0 3
mafia_b 157 1.18 1.31 0 3
mafia_db 160 1.16 1.31 0 3
mafia_cdb 274 1.55 1.21 0 3
sulfur 382 0.13 0.33 0 1
river 382 0.34 0.47 0 1
rugged 382 427.5 199.8 53.7 1149.3
diff.altitude 380 0.77 0.53 0.04 3.28
lauretum 382 0.43 0.50 0 1
intensive 382 0.52 0.50 0 1
product 382 1.61 0.74 1 3
pop (X1000) 323 6.27 12.43 0.3 185
dens 323 129.6 134.4 4.4 1164.3
roads 382 0.49 0.50 0 1
coast 382 0.30 0.46 0 1
distance 382 110.9 54.8 0.1 223.3
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Table 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c
sulfur 0.6228*** 0.6099*** 0.5142** 0.4725** 0.5106*** 0.5214*** 0.5151** 0.5765***
[0.1924] [0.1950] [0.2029] [0.2070] [0.1928] [0.1948] [0.2200] [0.2201]
river 0.7861*** 0.7841*** 0.7940*** 0.7964*** 0.6945*** 0.6784*** 0.4043*** 0.3632***
[0.1390] [0.1407] [0.1396] [0.1414] [0.1337] [0.1364] [0.1283] [0.1299]
rugged 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0006*
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004]
diff.altitude 0.2708** 0.2059 0.4173*** 0.3233**





product 0.5702*** 0.6160*** 0.3543*** 0.3416***
[0.0818] [0.0857] [0.0951] [0.0937]
dens 0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0011** 0.0013*** 0.0009** 0.0011**
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005]
roads 0.0761 0.1046 0.0710 0.1045 0.0738 0.0881 0.0797 0.0741
[0.1476] [0.1494] [0.1468] [0.1492] [0.1352] [0.1358] [0.1168] [0.1181]
coast -0.3129* -0.3449** -0.1255 -0.1395 -0.3378** -0.3084** -0.2358* -0.1856
[0.1697] [0.1717] [0.1637] [0.1720] [0.1405] [0.1458] [0.1230] [0.1267]
Constant 0.3596* 0.5661*** 0.5085** 0.7922*** -0.4896** -0.4106** 0.9121*** -0.0754
[0.1894] [0.1835] [0.2036] [0.1969] [0.2008] [0.2057] [0.3253] [0.3305]
Dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO Province Province
Observations 236 235 236 235 236 235 236 235
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.179 0.200 0.176 0.326 0.317 0.475 0.484
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets
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Table 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES mafia_c mafia_c mafia_d mafia_b mafia_db mafia_cdb
sulfur 0.6191*** 0.4137* 0.7849*** 0.4203 0.4479* 0.6406***
[0.2306] [0.2433] [0.2712] [0.2568] [0.2562] [0.1745]
river 0.3380** 0.2114* 0.1358 0.2160 0.2525 0.4224***
[0.1310] [0.1258] [0.1778] [0.2109] [0.2054] [0.1248]
diff.altitude 0.3257** 0.3896*** -0.0287 -0.1478 -0.1275 0.3138**
[0.1368] [0.1418] [0.1077] [0.1372] [0.1348] [0.1278]
product 0.2525*** 0.2677 0.0683 0.0387 0.0886 0.2632***
[0.0969] [0.2445] [0.1076] [0.1507] [0.1478] [0.0840]
dens 0.0012** 0.0014** 0.0015*** 0.0000 0.0002 0.0009*
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005]
roads 0.0927 0.1662 0.0614 0.0835 0.0878 0.1848
[0.1182] [0.1176] [0.1854] [0.2215] [0.2144] [0.1220]
coast -0.1258 -0.1573 0.0583 0.3467 0.3109 -0.0747
[0.1276] [0.1320] [0.2196] [0.2565] [0.2450] [0.1335]
dist_palermo -0.0067** 0.0063 -0.0058*** -0.0137*** -0.0131*** -0.0111***
[0.0027] [0.0054] [0.0017] [0.0021] [0.0020] [0.0011]
Constant 0.7723 -1.9283 0.7215* 2.3511*** 2.1357*** 1.5489***
[0.5808] [1.3232] [0.3691] [0.5414] [0.5283] [0.2972]
Dummies Province District NO NO NO NO
Observations 235 235 136 147 150 254
Adjusted R2 0.497 0.558 0.226 0.356 0.354 0.498
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets
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Table 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample West East pop<5000 pop>5000 Urban Rural
VARIABLES mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c mafia_c
sulfur 0.7914*** -0.2406 1.0544** 0.2186 0.3280 0.7648**
[0.2339] [0.4096] [0.4839] [0.2778] [0.3045] [0.3723]
river 0.1291 0.8528*** 0.3158 0.3529* 0.3110* 0.3169*
[0.1501] [0.2355] [0.2017] [0.1846] [0.1734] [0.1858]
diff.altitude 0.3375 0.1500 0.2120 0.3391 0.2842* 0.4479*
[0.2275] [0.1765] [0.1934] [0.2100] [0.1685] [0.2262]
product 0.2126** 0.4444*** 0.3958*** 0.1533 0.1777 0.4663***
[0.1002] [0.1683] [0.1462] [0.1345] [0.1285] [0.1456]
dens 0.0017** 0.0003 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011** 0.0021*
[0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0011]
roads 0.0842 -0.0473 -0.0150 0.0945 0.3477** -0.1163
[0.1639] [0.1721] [0.1575] [0.2125] [0.1651] [0.1671]
coast -0.1133 -0.1930 -0.1535 -0.1967 -0.1964 -0.1020
[0.1746] [0.1827] [0.1795] [0.1817] [0.1644] [0.2033]
Constant 1.4058*** 0.3900 1.1491* 0.0302 0.2401 0.3923
[0.3555] [0.5665] [0.6049] [0.4278] [0.3883] [0.5150]
Dummies Province Province Province Province Province Province
Observations 118 117 122 109 115 120
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.347 0.433 0.446 0.508 0.430
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets
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